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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

THOMAS D. MONTES,

:

Case No. 890336-CA

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant, :
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction of burglary, a
third degree felony, and theft, a second degree felony, after a
jury trial in the Eighth Judicial District Court.

This Court has

jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 782a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1989).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Whether defense counsel acted competently in not

objecting to portions of the testimony of Monica Lawson at trial?
An appellate court must review the reasonableness of counsel's
conduct in view of all circumstances and must entertain a strong
presumption that counsel's conduct was reasonably part of trial
strategy and tactics.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,

689-90 (1984).
2.

Whether defense counsel acted effectively in not

objecting to the testimony of Tom Jones at trial?

An appellate

court must review the reasonableness of counsel's conduct in view

of all circumstances and must entertain a strong presumption that
counsel's conduct was reasonably part of trial strategy and
tactics.

Strickland v, Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689-90 (1984).
3.

Whether the State's cross-examination of Davey

Montes was reasonably within the scope of his direct examination,
thus justifying defense counsel's decision not to object to the
cross-examination?

An appellate court must review the

reasonableness of counsel's conduct in view of all circumstances
and must entertain a strong presumption that counsel's conduct
was reasonably part of trial strategy and tactics.

Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689-90 (1984).
4.

Whether defense counsel acted competently in not

objecting to the rebuttal testimony of Jeanna Hackford and in not
requesting a limiting instruction for her testimony?

An

appellate court must review the reasonableness of counsel's
conduct in view of all circumstances and must entertain a strong
presumption that counsel's conduct was reasonably part of trial
strategy and tactics.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,

689-90 (1984).
5.

Whether the trial court committed plain error for

failing to require sua sponte a limiting instruction regarding
Ms. Hackford's testimony?

To find plain error, an appellate

court's examination of the record must reveal that the error
should have been both obvious to the trial court and prejudicial
to the defendant.

State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 35 (Utah),

cert, denied, 110 S. Ct. 62 (1989); State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116,
121 (Utah 1989).
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6.

Whether defense counsel was ineffective for not

informing the court of alleged conversations between jury members
during the trial?

Where the record is incomplete, an appellate

court must presume the correctness of the judgment below.
Sampson v. Richinsf 770 P.2d 998# 1003 (Utah Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 776 P.2d 916 (1989).
7.

Whether defense counsel was ineffective for not

informing the court that the defendant was seen by jurors in
handcuffs outside the courtroom during the trial?

Where the

record is incomplete, an appellate court must presume the
correctness of the judgment below.

Sampson v. Richins# 770 P.2d

998, 1003 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Utah R. Evid 801(d)(l)t
(d) Statements which are not hearsay.
statement is not hearsay if:

A

(1) Prior statement by witness. The
declarant testifies at the trial or hearing
and is subject to cross-examination
concerning the statement and the statement is
(A) inconsistent with his testimony or the
witness denies having made the statement or
has forgotten, or (B) consistent with his
testimony and is offered to rebut an express
or implied charge against him of recent
fabrication or improper influence or motive,
or (C) one of identification of a person made
after perceiving him; or
Utah R. Evid. 105s
When evidence which is admissible as to
one party or for one purpose but not
admissible as to another party or for another
purpose is admitted, the court, upon request,
shall restrict the evidence to its proper
scope and instruct the jury accordingly.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with burglary, a third degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1990) and
theft, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-6-404 (1990).

Defendant was found guilty after a jury trial

on February 24, 1989 in the Eighth Judicial District Court, the
Honorable Dennis L. Draney, Judge, presiding (R. 102-03, 262).
Judge Draney sentenced defendant to serve a term of zero to five
(0-5) years for the burglary conviction and one to fifteen (1-15)
years for the theft conviction (R. 44-45, 268).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the evening of November 15, 1987, someone broke into
Sather's Jewelry Store in Roosevelt, Utah and absconded with gold
rings, watches, and pendants (R. 136-37, 157-59).

Robert Sather,

the owner of the store, estimated the value of the stolen
property at $15,000 to $35,000 (R. 160). Sather testified that
he had given nobody permission to possess or distribute the
stolen merchandise (R. 162).
Earlier the same evening, defendant, Lyle Hendrix,
Monica Lawson, and Torlinna Lawson had been driving around the
Roosevelt area in a blue Suzuki Samurai stopping at several
convenience stores (R. 167-168, 171). Finally, the Samurai
stopped in front of Sather's Jewelry Store (R. 168). Defendant
and Hendrix got out of the vehicle and peaked in the window (R.
168-69, 170). When defendant and Hendrix returned to the car,
one of them said, "It's too easy.
177).

A piece of cake." (R. 170,

They also discussed a "payoff" (R. 170).
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At approximately 10:00 p.m., a passing motorist, Tom
Jones, noticed two people looking in the window of Sather's with
a blue Samurai parked nearby (R. 182, 183). He had previously
noticed the same vehicle at several Roosevelt convenience stores
(R. 181). While Jones could not identify the men in the vehicle,
he did recognize Monica Lawson (R. 183, 187).
At about 10:30 p.m., defendant took Monica and Torlinna
Lawson home (R. 168). Fifteen minutes later, defendant and
Hendrix arrived at an apartment belonging to Angela Conger and
Clint Perank (R. 189, 191). Defendant and Hendrix left and came
back approximately fifteen minutes later with jewelry in bags and
trays (R. 189-90).

Defendant and Hendrix sorted the jewelry into

paper bags and then left when Conger insisted they do so (R. 190,
193, 195)

The two returned a few minutes later with some more

jewelry, but soon left for the final time (R. 190). Conger's
apartment was less than half a block from Sather's Jewelry Store
(R. 193).
The next day, Monica Lawson saw Davey Montes,
defendant's brother, at Union High School (R. 172). Monica,
having heard of the burglary and being aware of defendant's
actions the previous evening, asked Davey if defendant and
Hendrix had burglarized the store.

Ld.

Davey answered in the

affirmative and showed Monica some rings that defendant and
Hendrix had given him.

Id.

At trial, defendant presented an alibi defense.
Hendrix testified that he had given defendant a ride to Roosevelt
so that defendant could see his parole officer (R. 205). Hendrix

-5-

affirmed Monica's testimony that he, defendant, Monica, and
Torlinna Lawson went out driving (R. 206). He denied discussing
Sather's Jewelry Store with either girl or being in the vicinity
of the store with them (R. 207). He also denied defendant was
involved in the burglary (R. 207, 211). According to Hendrix,
after dropping the Lawson girls off at their home, he took
defendant to the home of defendant's parents (R. 208). Hendrix
said he went to Clint Perank's house by himself (R. 208-09).

He

also testified that he, defendant and two girls travelled to
Ogden later that evening (R. 209-12, 224).
Defendant's father, David Montes, testified that he had
returned home from a bowling tournament between 10:30 and 11:00
p.m. that evening and that defendant was present when he arrived
(R. 216). He further testified that Hendrix, defendant, and two
girls left around 3:00 a.m.

Id.

Davey Montes corroborated the testimony of his father
that defendant arrived at the Montes home at approximately 10:30
p.m. (R. 220). According to Davey, Hendrix left without
defendant after dropping defendant off.

J^L

Davey said

defendant, Hendrix, and their traveling companions left between
2:00 and 3:00 a.m.

JW.

On cross-examination, the State asked

Davey if he had seen Monica at school the next day (R. 222).
While Davey remembered the conversation with Monica, he denied
possessing any rings or other jewelry and denied telling Monica
that his brother was involved in the burglary.

Id.

In rebuttal, the State called Jeanna Hackford, Davey's
former girlfriend (R. 227). Jeanna testified that Davey told her
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that his brother "and some other guy" were involved in the
burglary (R. 228).
Defendant's sister, Stephanie, testified consistently
with her father and her brother that defendant was in the Montes
home at 11:00 p.m. (R. 225). She also testified that they left
between 2:00 and 3:00 a.m. (R. 225-26).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
For a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel to
succeed, the defendant must show both that the performance by
counsel was deficient and that the defendant was prejudiced by
the conduct.
In the present case, overwhelming evidence supports
defendant's guilt.

Monica Lawson placed defendant outside of the

jewelry store and conferring with a confederate in language from
which a reasonable jury could infer an intent to break into the
store.

Angela Conger observed defendant's possession of jewelry

and rings shortly afterward.

The jury apparently believed the

State's witnesses and disbelieved defendant's alibi witnesses.
Under the totality of the circumstances, and in view of the
overwhelming evidence against defendant, there is no reasonable
probability of a different result in the absence of the claimed
ineffective assistance of defense counsel.
In any event, defendant's claims of ineffective counsel
are individually meritless.

Monica's testimony about her

conversation with defendant's brother the day after the robbery
was properly admitted and an objection by defense counsel would
have been pointless.

Even though the statements were hearsay,
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the confrontation rights of defendant were not thwarted since the
statements were made by defendant's brother who testified as a
defense witness.

Monica's testimony was directly relevant to the

issue of defendant's guilt.

Defendant does not establish that a

Rule 403 objection for undue prejudice would succeed since a
trial judge has wide discretion in applying the
probative/prejudice balancing test.
Tom Jones's testimony was relevant since he
corroborated a portion of Monica's testimony.

Jones recalled

seeing a blue Suzuki Samari parked in front of the jewelry store
on the night of the burglary, observed two of its passengers
peering into the window of the jewelry store, and recognized
Monica as one of the passengers.

Since his testimony

corroborated Monica's testimony, it was properly admitted at
trial.

The prosecutor laid adequate foundation for Jones to

testify.
The State properly cross-examined Davey Montes.

The

questions asked went directly to Davey's credibility, a critical
issue for the jury to evaluate given the nature of defendant's
alibi defense.
The State also properly called Jeanna Hackford as a
rebuttal witness regarding Davey's testimony.

Because Jeanna's

testimony was substantive non-hearsay evidence under Utah R.
Evid. 801(d)(1)(A), it was not ineffective for defense counsel to
fail to request a Utah R. Evid. 105 limiting instruction.
Nor did the trial court commit plain error in not
giving a limiting instruction sua sponte where Jeanna's testimony
was admitted as substantive evidence.
-8-

Defendant's final two allegations of error should not
be considered because his claims are not supported by the record,
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE FOR
FAILING TO OBJECT TO MONICA LAWSON'S
TESTIMONY.
Defendant claims that he was afforded ineffective
assistance of counsel due to the alleged incompetent actions of
his defense attorney, Roland Uresk.

All of defendant's claims

lack merit and should be summarily rejected.

However, each claim

will be addressed in turn.
As cited by defendant, the accepted standard for a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is set forth in
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

In order to

prevail on an ineffectiveness claim, a defendant "must show,
first that his or her counsel rendered a deficient performance in
some demonstrable manner, which performance fell below an
objective standard of reasonable professional judgment, and,
second, that counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant."
State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 893 (Utah 1989) (citing
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88).
While this Court has overturned convictions for
ineffective assistance of counsel only twice, the Utah Supreme
Court has never overturned a conviction for ineffective
assistance of counsel.

State v. Moritzsky, 771 P.2d 688 (Utah

Ct. App. 1989); State v. Crestani, 771 P.2d 1085 (Utah Ct. App.
1989).

In both Moritzsky and Crestani, special circumstances
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existed.

In Moritzsky, the defense attorney was unaware of a

recent change in the law and, consequently, did not ask for a
legitimate jury instruction which could have changed the outcome
of the trial.

Moritzskyf 771 P.2d at 692-93.

In Crestani# the

defense attorney, a former Utah Attorney General, did not prepare
adequately for trial by properly investigating his client's case.
This Court held that if a proper investigation had been
conducted, the outcome of the trial might have been different.
Crestani, 771 P.2d at 1091-92.
In State v. Lairbyf 699 P.2d 1187 (Utah 1984), the Utah
Supreme Court adopted the Strickland standard as consistent with
its previous holdings regarding effective assistance of counsel.
Id. at 1203 (citing Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101, 1109 (Utah
1983)).

According to Lairby, the burden of proof lies with the

defendant and counsel's ineffectiveness must be a demonstrable
reality, not a speculative matter.

Lairby, 699 P.2d at 1203.

Trial strategy or tactics do not rise to the level of
ineffectiveness of counsel simply because they did not produce
the anticipated result.
be prejudicial.

Id.

Ici. The deficiency in performance must

See Codianna, 660 P.2d at 1109; State v.

McNichol, 554 P.2d 203, 204 (Utah 1976).

To be prejudicial,

there must be a "reasonable probability" that the outcome would
be different.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. This Court has

defined reasonable probability as "a probability sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome."

Crestani, 771 P.2d at 1089

(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 494). Mere speculation that an
outcome may have been different is not sufficient.
Archuleta, 747 P.2d 1019, 1024 (Utah 1987).
-10-

State v.

Legitimate choices of tactics or strategy by an
attorney will not normally fall beneath the standard of
reasonableness.

State v. Bullockf 119 Utah Adv. Rep. 33, 36

(Utah 1989), petition for cert, filed, (Feb. 20, 1990).; State v.
Speer, 750 P.2d 186, 191 (Utah 1988).
at 689.

See Strickland, 466 U.S.

"[S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation

of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually
unchallengeable."

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.

See Crestani,

771 P.2d at 1090.

Such "[d]ecisions as to . . . what objections

to make . . . are generally left to the professional judgment of
counsel."

State v. Medina, 738 P.2d 1021, 1023 (Utah 1987).

In

State v. Malmrose, 649 P.2d 56 (Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme
Court said,

,f

[t]his Court will not second guess the strategy of

counsel at trial."

Malmrose, 649 P.2d at 59.

Similarly, other jurisdictions have also concluded that
trial tactics or strategy should be given wide latitude.

The

Colorado Supreme Court stated that the "public defender's
decision not to object to what the defendant characterizes as
prejudicial and irrelevant evidence falls within the reach of
trial strategy."

People v. Bossert, 722 P.2ds 998, 1010 (Colo.

1986).
The Utah Supreme Court has taken a dim view of
ineffective assistance of counsel claims based solely on the lack
of an objection by defense counsel at trial without a showing of
resulting prejudice.
(Utah 1989).

State v. Butterfield, 784 P.2d 153, 159

The Court explained that to allow ineffective

assistance of counsel claims without a showing of prejudice would
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encourage defendants to manipulate the system by not objecting at
trial, then claiming ineffectiveness of counsel on appeal•

Id.

See Strickland, 484 U.S. at 693.
In the present case, defendant fails on both prongs of
the Strickland test.

He fails to demonstrate a reasonable

probability that the outcome would have been different but for
counsel's allegedly deficient performance.
defendant's guilt was overwhelming.

The evidence of

Based solely on evidence

about which defendant does not complain, a jury could reasonably
convict defendant of the jewelry store burglary and theft.
Defendant and Lyle Hendrix were seen looking into the window of
Sather's Jewelry Store with one of them saying, "It's a piece of
cake1' (R. 170). Defendant and Lyle Hendrix arrived at Angela
Conger's apartment on the evening of the burglary bearing trays
full of rings and other jewelry (R. 189-90).

Since there is no

reasonable probability the outcome would have been different
absent the alleged errors, defendant fails to satisfy the second
prong of Strickland.
claim.

This alone defeats his ineffectiveness

See Archuleta, 747 P.2d at 1023.

In any event,

defendant's claims of deficient performance will be examined
individually.
Defendant complains that Monica Lawson should not have,
been allowed to testify that she had seen defendant's brother,
Davey Montes, at high school the day after the robbery.

She

testified that she asked him if his brother committed the robbery
of Sather's Jewelry Store (R. 172). Davey Montes said yes and
showed her some rings which Hendrix and his brother had given
him.

Id.
-12-

Defendant claims that the testimony was improper for
three separate reasons.

First, defendant claims that the

statement was inadmissible hearsay.
testimony was irrelevant.

Second, defendant claims the

Finally, defendant claims that the

testimony was more prejudicial than probative.

None of these

contentions has any merit.
A.

THE STATEMENTS WERE NOT IMPERMISSIBLE HEARSAY.

Hearsay is defined as "a statement, other than one made
by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing,
offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted."
Utah R. Evid. 801(c).

The well-recognized purpose of the hearsay

rule is to secure to the accused the sixth amendment right to
confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him.

See U.S.

Const, amend. VI; California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155-56
(1970).

Rule 802 of the Utah Rules of Evidence states that

hearsay "is not admissible except as provided by law or by these
rules" (emphasis added).

The United States Supreme Court has

ruled that it is not a violation of the Confrontation Clause to
admit a declarant's out-of-court statements as long as he is
testifying as a witness at trial and is subject to crossexamination.

Green, 399 U.S. at 162. Merely because evidence is

admitted in violation of the hearsay rule does not mean that
confrontation rights have been violated.

Id. at 156.

The Utah

Supreme Court has similarly recognized that a defendant's
confrontation rights are not violated by the admission of out-ofcourt statements of a witness subject to cross-examination
regarding those statements.

State v. Marcumf 750 P.2d 599, 603
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(Utah 1988); State v. Loughton, 747 P.2d 426, 429 (Utah 1987);
State v, Fulton, 742 P.2d 1208, 1218-19 (Utah 1987), cert, denied
484 U.S. 1044 (1988); State v. Nelson, 725 P.2d 1353, 1356 (Utah
1986).
In the present case, defendant is objecting because of
the out-of-court statements of one of his own witnesses.

Davey

Montes was called as a defense witness at trial (R. 218).
Counsel could have asked Davey about this statement on direct
examination, but chose not to do so.

On cross-examination, the

prosecution did ask Davey about whether he had told Monica that
his brother had committed the robbery (R. 222-23).

Davey denied

having done so (R. 223). See infra Point III of this Brief.
Since Davey was available to testify and actually did
testify for the defense, Monica's testimony concerning their
conversation the day after the robbery, though technically
hearsay, was admissible under the case law cited above.
B.

THE TESTIMONY WAS RELEVANT.

Defendant also claims that Davey's statement to Monica
was irrelevant.

To the contrary, it was quite relevant.

Irrelevant evidence has been defined as "that which has no legal
tendency to establish any material proposition.

Thus the

appropriate test of the relevancy of such evidence is whether the
proffered evidence would render the desired inference more
probable then [sic] it would be without such evidence."
Johns, 615 P.2d 1260, 1263 (Utah 1980).
717 P.2d 1313, 1316 (Utah 1986).
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State v.

See also State v. Gray,

The statements made by Davey to Monica directly went to
the elements of the crime of theft.

A person commits theft if

"he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over the property
of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof."
Ann. S 76-6-404 (1990).

Utah Code

By giving his brother some of the

jewelry from Sather's Jewelry Store, it could be reasonably
inferred that defendant intended to deprive Sather's Jewelry
Store of its property and that defendant came into possession of
the property illegally.
C.

Thus, the testimony was relevant.

THE EVIDENCE WAS MORE PROBATIVE THAN PREJUDICIAL.

Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence, provides that
evidence may be excluded at trial if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of "unfair prejudice."
Defendant contends that the probative value of Monica's testimony
about Davey's statements is less than its prejudicial effect that
had defense counsel objected, the trial court would have been
obliged to exclude it and that the trial court would have erred
had it been admitted.

Within the context of Rule 403, "unfair

prejudice" requires that the disputed evidence have more than
mere detrimental effect on defendant's case; it must have an
"undue tendency to suggest a decision on an improper basis,
commonly, though not necessarily an emotional one."

United

States v. Grassi# 602 F.2d 1192, 1197 (5th Cir. 1979), vacated,
448 U.S. 902, aff'd on other grounds, 626 F.2d 444, cert, denied,
450 U.S. 956 (1981) (citations omitted).
Defendant makes a conclusory statement that he was
prejudiced by Monica's testimony.

-15-

Mere prejudice does not make

evidence inadmissible.

Testimony which goes to defendant's guilt

by its nature is prejudicial•

The operative term is "unfair."

Noticeably, defendant does not articulate how the testimony was
"unfair."

Davey's statements the day after the break-in go

directly to an inference that defendant came into possession of
the property illegally and were not "unfairly" prejudicial.
Even if defense counsel had objected on Rule 403
grounds, the trial court would have had wide discretion in
determining whether the statement was admissible or inadmissible.
See State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338, 1352-53 (Utah 1977), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 882 (1978).

Other than his conclusory

statement, defendant has not demonstrated that the trial court
would have found his statement more prejudicial than probative
had an objection been lodged.

Nor has defendant shown that the

prejudicial effect of the testimony would rise above the level of
"harmless error."

See State v. Rammel, 721 P.2d 498, 501 (Utah

1986) (decided under Rule 45, which was superseded by Rule 403).
POINT II
TOM JONES'S TESTIMONY WAS ADMISSIBLE.
Defendant next complains that the entire testimony of
Tom Jones should have been excluded at trial and the failure of
defense counsel to object to Jones' testimony was ineffective
assistance of counsel.

Defendant claims that inadequate

foundation was laid for Jones's testimony.

The claim has no merit.

It should be noted that defendant cites no case law to support
his theory that Jones's testimony was improper. See State v.
Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1988) (court may decline to
rule on argument unsupported by legal analysis or authority).
-16-

Defendant argues that because Jones could not
individually recognize defendant when he saw a blue Samarai
outside of Sather's Jewelry Store and saw two men peering into
the store, his testimony should be excluded.

Defendant misstates

the record when he claims that "Mr. Jones could only identify one
of the occupants of the car as a tall guy with a scar over his
eye."

(Brief of App. at 9).

Jones testified that he recognized

the Samurai outside of Sather's as being the same one he had seen
earlier in the evening (R. 182). More importantly, Jones
testified that earlier in the evening he recognized one of the
passengers as Monica Lawson (R. 187).
Rule 602, Utah Rules of Evidence, requires personal
knowledge in order for a witness to be competent to testify.
Evidence to prove personal knowledge can come from the witness's
own testimony.
At trial, the State laid sufficient foundation to
reflect Jones's knowledge that he recognized the vehicle in front
of Sather's as the same vehicle he had noticed earlier in the
evening.

Jones testified that he noticed a blue Samurai parked

in front of a Circle K convenience store (R. 180). He said he
noticed it because it was parked in an unusual manner in front of
the store.

Id.

Jones identified the same Samurai in front of

another convenience store later in the evening (R. 181). Jones
said he remembered the encounter because the occupants of the
Samurai were staring at him.

Id.

He also remembered seeing two

males and two females in the vehicle. .Id. After noticing the
Samurai at least twice, and recognizing one of the passengers,

-17-

Jones saw the same vehicle parked in front of Sather's Jewelry
Store with two men looking in the window.

(R. 182).

Therefore, adequate foundation was laid for Jones to
testify about what he observed—testimony which directly
corroborated Monica's testimony given just minutes before.
POINT III
THE STATE'S CROSS-EXAMINATION OF DAVEY MONTES
WAS NOT IMPROPER.
Defendant claims that defense counsel should have
objected to questions posed by the State during its crossexamination of Davey Montes.

Specifically, defendant claims the

State asked questions which were beyond the scope of the direct
examination and lacked proper foundation.

Defendant's claim is

frivolous.
First, it should be noted once again that defendant
cites no case law to support his contention that the State's
cross-examination was improper.

See Amicone, 689 P.2d at 1344.

He merely concludes, without authority, that because defense
counsel did not ask Davey Montes what he did the next day, the
prosecution should have been precluded from inquiring about that
on cross-examination.
Defendant's claim involves a misreading of Rule 611(b),
Utah Rules of Evidence, which states: "Cross-examination should
be limited to the subject matter of the direct examination and
matters affecting the credibility of the witness.

The court may,

in the exercise of discretion, permit inquiry into additional
matters as if on direct examination."
608 P.2d 218, 228 (Utah 1980).
-18-

See also State v. Jarrell,

The State's entire cross-examination of Davey Montes
consists of the following colloquy:
Q.

Davey, do you remember what you were
doing on the 25th of November of 1987?

A.

No.

Q.

How about the 2nd of November, 1987?

A.

November we went sleigh riding.

Q.

Do you remember which day?

A.

No.

Q.

What sticks the date of the 15th and 16th
in your head?

A.

Well, this that's happened.

Q.

Okay. Now, when did you find out what
happened?

A.

When I got subpoenaed to come to court.

Q.

Didn't you know that night that something
had happened?

A.

No.

Q.

Did you ever tell anybody that you did?

A.

No.

Q.

Did you see Monica Lawson the next
morning at school?

A.

Yes.

Q.

About 9 o'clock?

A.

No.

Q.

Did you have some rings, crossing hearts,
and things?

A.

No.

Q.

Did she say she had heard of a burglary
and ask if Tom was involved, and you said
yes?

I don't.

I can't quite remember.

I didn't.
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A.

No. She asked me if he was involved and
I said, "I don't know." I don't know
what she is talking about, either, if I
had any rings. But I would not get
involved with something like that, even
if it did happen, which I don't know
about. I didn't know about it then. She
was asking me questions.

Q.

And you had rings with you, didn't you?

A.

No.

Q.

And you told her Tom Montes was involved,
didn't you?

A.

No.

Q.

Did you talk to a girl named Jeanna
Hackford about this?

A.

She asked me about it.

Q.

Did you tell her Tom and Lyle did it?

A.

No.

(R. 222-23).
Clearly, the State's cross-examination was proper under
Rule 611(b) as a matter relating to Davey's veracity.

Davey's

denial was directly contradicted by Monica's previous testimony.
Further, the trial court had discretion to permit the State to
proceed into additional matters as if on direct examination.

Had

defense counsel objected, the trial court could have properly
overruled the objection.
As to defendant's claim that the cross-examination
lacked foundation, the State's cross-examination merely expanded
on the foundation laid by defense counsel during direct
examination.
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POINT IV
THE REBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF JEANNA HACKFORD WAS
ADMISSIBLE.
Defendant next alleges that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel because defense counsel should have
objected to Jeanna Hackford's rebuttal testimony at trial as
prejudicial or, in the alternative, requested a limiting
instruction on the scope of her testimony.

As with his other

claims, this claim must also fail.
After Davey Montes testified, the State called Jeanna
Hackford as a rebuttal witness.

Jeanna testified that Davey had

confided to her that he was worried about being in trouble
because of the break-in at Sather's Jewelry Store (R. 228). He
told her that his brother and "some other guy" were involved.
Id.

Davey had previously denied the statements (R. 223).
The State agrees with defendant's contention in his

brief that Jeanna's statements were impeachment testimony and not
hearsay under Rule 801(d)(1)(A), Utah Rules of Evidence.
Brief of App. at pp. 10-11).

(See

However, the State disagrees that

the statements had limited admissibility under Rule 105, Utah
2
Rules of Evidence.

The committee notes to Rule 801 explain that

the Utah rule "deviates from the federal rule in that it allows
use of prior statements as substantive evidence if (1)
2
Rule 105 states as follows:
When evidence which is admissible as to
one party or for one purpose but not
admissible as to another party or for another
purpose is admitted, the court, upon request,
shall restrict the evidence to its proper
scope and instruct the jury accordingly.
-21-

inconsistent . . . .M

The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Ramsey,

782 P.2d 480, 484 (Utah 1989)f acknowledged that under Rule
801(d)(1)(A) prior inconsistent statements are admissible as
substantive evidence.

Therefore, the statement was not limited

in purpose under Rule 105 and no limiting instruction was
required even if requested.
Defendant also claims that the potential prejudice of
Jeanna's testimony substantially outweighed its probative value.
Again, defendant fails to specify how the testimony was "unfairly
prejudicial."

In that

ff

[t]he burden of showing error is on the

party who seeks to upset the judgment," State v. Jones, 657 P.2d
1263, 1267 (Utah 1982), the State should not be put to the task
of developing defendant's legal arguments by searching through
the record for possible factual support.

Thus, this Court should

not consider defendant's general claim of error in the absence of
specific allegations.
POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT PLAIN ERROR IN
NOT GIVING A LIMITED INSTRUCTION.
Defendant argues that the trial court committed plain
error in not issuing a cautionary instruction based on Jeanna
Hackford's testimony.

This claim also fails.

In order for a claim of plain error to succeed,
defendant must show both that from the appellate court's
examination of the record that it was obvious to a trial court
that it was committing error and that the error affected the
substantial rights of the accused.

State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d

29, 35 (Utah), cert, denied, 110 S. Ct. 62 (1989); State v.
-22-

Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 122 (Utah 1989); State v. Speer, 750 P.2d
186, 189 (Utah 1988) •
As discussed in Point IV, supra, defendant was not
entitled to a Rule 105 limiting instruction even if one had been
requested.

Thus, no plain error occurred by the trial court's

failure to sua sponte include an unnecessary limiting
instruction.
POINT VI
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT CONSIDER DEFENDANT'S
CLAIMS BASED ON MATTERS OUTSIDE THE APPELLATE
RECORD.
Defendant claims that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel because counsel did not alert the court
that certain jurors had discussed the case during a recess in the
trial (Point VI) and that jurors saw defendant in handcuffs
during a recess (Point VII).

Because defendant's claim is not

supported by the record on appeal, this Court should not consider
defendant's claims.

State v. Bingham, 684 P.2d 43, 46 (Utah

1984) (Court cannot rule on matters outside the trial court
record).
Defendant relies upon affidavits from himself and his
sister to support his contentions on appeal.
are not part of the record.
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These affidavits

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the State requests that
defendant's convictions be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this

^ y ^ d a y of June, 1990.

R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

A

DAN R. LARSEN
"/?"
Assistant Attorney General

J&f
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Mary T. Noonan
Clerk of the Court
Utah Court of Appeals
400 Midtown Plaza
230 South 500 East
Salt Lake Ci*- "tah 84111

^ - • : o - 5 > court

jiare v. Thomas D. Montes, Case 8 90336-CA
Dear *'s. Nocnan:
The appellant's attorney
. t.< -.._'.
,ed case,- A~
•vith Aria^rs v. California, 38' U. f!. 7 3
) , has
:t.ea, in the Prief of Appellant, that :\ _s ^pinion that
uie issues raised on appeal are not sound and has requested that
he bp allowed to withdraw. Respondent believes that the brief
filed by appellant's counsel is in substantial compliance wit:.
the requirements of State v. Clayton, 639 P.2d 168 (Utah 1981 >
Under these circumstances, it would be futile to respond to a
brief of this nature when the only assistance we could lei,..; *r*
Court would be to repeat the statements of the appellant's
attorney and perhaps illuminate the broad area of 1PT* c\ir^
the issue raised ;~ V - case.
Respondent requests * ! • •_
a formal response in i \&\. oi 1 i 1 Lng
a brief and either pi
J
dismiss the appeal on its merits or in harmony with Anders v.
California.
If the Court desires a further resr^r^t' '-v;r *: ^e
wi 3 1 g 1 a d 1 y c oir.p 1 y u p : r eq u e s t.
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State v, Thomas P. Montes, Case 890336-CA

Dear Ms. Noonan:
T::> , ^ . . rr
, *i. A*X above entitled caseharmony with Aiders ^ ''*
36' L\ f*. 7?8 (1967), has
ptated, in the Brief
-*>«*
.- his opinion that
\i\e issues raise i
ire not sound and has requested tn:;:
:•*? be allowed tc *
Respondent believes that the brief
* .led by appellant's counsel is in substantial compliance wit"
..*.- requirements of State v. Clayton,, 639 P. 2d 16P^ "Jtah ;9BI
;vier these circumstances, it would be futile to r- -••;.• >nd to a
] ef of this nature wher, th» : ly assistance we c-:.,lJ lend the
^jurt would be to repeat th
* it^r-nts ot the appellant's
attorney and perhaps illumi^*4 /_ ", l> *-•» - 1 ->*"•*-> ~* ^surround .
- ig
the issue raised : i. t'- ;;ar-:
Respondent requests Lne L-^.. ,
n^t^t Liiis letter as
a formal response . r. Ilea of filing a brief and either proceed to
dismiss the appeal on its merits or in harmony with Anders v.
California. If the Court desire- * f u r t h ^ repp'-r,?^ , our office
wi 11 g 1 ad 1 y corru, 1 y up - request
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